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Universal statistical properties of poker tournaments
Cle´ment Sire∗
Laboratoire de Physique The´orique - IRSAMC, Universite´ Paul Sabatier & CNRS, Toulouse, France
We present a simple model of Texas hold’em poker tournaments which retains the two main
aspects of the game: i. the minimal bet grows exponentially with time; ii.players have a finite
probability to bet all their money. The distribution of the fortunes of players not yet eliminated is
found to be independent of time during most of the tournament, and reproduces accurately data
obtained from Internet tournaments and world championship events. This model also makes the
connection between poker and the persistence problem widely studied in physics, as well as some
recent physical models of biological evolution, and extreme value statistics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physicists are now more then ever involved in the study
of complex systems which do not belong to the tradi-
tional realm of their science. Finance (options theory,...)
[1], human networks (Internet, airports,...) [2], the dy-
namics of biological evolution [3, 4] and in general of
competitive “agents” [5, 6, 7] are just a few examples
of problems recently addressed by statistical physicists.
However, many of these systems are not isolated and are
thus sometimes very difficult to describe quantitatively:
a financial model cannot predict the occurrence of wars
or natural disasters which certainly affect financial mar-
kets, nor can it include the effect of all important exter-
nal parameters (China’s GDP growth, German exports,
Google’s profit...). Rather, these studies try to capture
important qualitative features which, interestingly, are
sometimes universal. In this context, universality means
that large scale aspects of the real system are properly re-
produced by a simple model which only retains the main
relevant ingredients of the original physics. Adding fur-
ther details to the model does not affect these universal
properties.
In the present work, we study a very human and play-
ful activity: poker tournaments. Although a priori gov-
erned by human laws (bluff, prudence, aggressiveness...),
we shall find that some of their interesting properties
can be quantitatively described. One of the appealing
aspects of a poker tournament lies in the obvious fact
that it is a truly isolated system, which is not affected
by any external phenomenon. Two famous mathemati-
cians (E´mile Borel [8], and later John von Neumann [9])
contributed to the science of poker. However, they con-
centrated on head-to-head games, like their most recent
followers [10], obtaining the best strategy in terms of
the value of the hand and the pot. To our knowledge,
the present work represents the first study of large scale
poker tournaments. Note however that in a recent work
[6], the authors study head-to-head elimination tourna-
ments involving seeded competitors, and apply success-
fully their theory to the US college basketball national
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championship.
In the following, we introduce a simple model which
can be treated analytically and which faithfully repro-
duces some properties of Internet and live poker tourna-
ments. Our main quantities of interest are the distribu-
tion of the fortunes of surviving players, their decay rate,
the number of different players owning the biggest for-
tune at any given time during the tournament (dubbed
the “chip leader”), and the distribution of their fortune.
Interestingly, the constraint that a surviving player must
keep a positive fortune relates poker tournaments to the
problem of persistence [11, 12, 13], and the competitive
nature of the game connects some of our results with
recent models of competing agents [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. In ad-
dition, the properties of the chip leader display extreme
value statistics, a phenomenon observed in many physical
systems [6, 14, 15].
In Section II, we define a stochastic model which re-
tains the main identified ingredients of poker tourna-
ments: i. the minimal bet grows exponentially with time;
ii. players have a finite probability q to bet all their
money. In Section III, we first solve the correspond-
ing model for q = 0, which will allow us to make the
connection with the persistence problem widely studied
by physicists. In Section IV, we will show that q must
physically take a specific value, and thus is not a free pa-
rameter. The results of the model will compare favorably
with actual data recorded from real Internet poker tour-
naments and World Poker Tour main events. Finally, in
the last Section V, we will consider the statistical prop-
erties of the chip leader. In particular, we will show the
connection with the “leader problem” arising in evolu-
tionary biophysics, and the field of extreme value statis-
tics which has recently attracted a lot of attention from
physicists.
II. A SIMPLE POKER MODEL
Before addressing the basic rules of poker and the re-
sulting definition of our model, we wish to introduce some
useful poker terminology. In a real poker tournament,
players first pay the same entry fee or “buy-in” (from 1 $
to 25000 $) which is converted in “chips”. Hence players
are not betting actual money but chips. The total num-
2ber of chips of a player is called his “stack”. At any time
in the tournament, if a player decides to bet his entire
stack, it is said that he is going “all-in”.
We now describe the main aspects of a Texas hold’em
poker tournament, currently the most popular form of
poker. Initially, N0 players sit around tables accepting
up to θ = 10 players. In real poker tournaments, N0
typically lies in the range N0 ∼ 10 − 10000. We do not
detail the precise rules of Texas hold’em poker, as we shall
see that their actual form is totally irrelevant provided
that two crucial ingredients of the game are kept:
• A tournament consists in a series of independent
games or “deals”. Before a deal starts, the two play-
ers next to the dealer (i.e. the player dealing the cards)
post the minimal bet, which is called the “blind”. This
term arises from the fact that they bet before actually
seeing their cards. The blinds also ensure that there is
some money in the pot to play for at the very start of
the game. The blind b increases exponentially with time,
and typically changes to the value 40 $, 60 $, 100 $, 200 $,
300 $, 400 $,... every 10-15 minutes on Internet tourna-
ments, hence being multiplied by a factor 10 every hour
or so. We shall see that the growth rate of the blind en-
tirely controls the pace of a tournament, a phenomenon
observed in another context in [7]. Therefore, the fact
that the blind grows exponentially with time must be a
major ingredient of any realistic model of poker.
• The next players post their bets (≥ b) according to
their evaluation of the two cards they each receive. There
are subsequent rounds of betting following the succes-
sive draws of five common cards. Ultimately, the betting
player with the best hand of five cards (selected from
its two cards and the five common cards) wins the pot.
Most of the deals end up with a player winning a small
multiple of the blind. However, during certain deals, two
or more players can aggressively raise each other, so that
they finally bet a large fraction, if not all, of their chips.
This can happen when a player goes all-in, hence betting
all his chips. Any serious model of poker should take into
account the fact that players often bet a few blinds, but
sometimes end up betting all or a large fraction of their
chips.
Once a player loses all his chips, he is eliminated. Dur-
ing the course of the tournament, some players may be
redistributed to other tables, in order to keep the number
of tables minimum.
Retaining the two main ingredients mentioned above,
we now define a simple version of poker which turns out
to describe quantitatively the evolution of real poker tour-
naments. The N0 initial players are distributed at tables
with θ = 10 seats. They receive the same amount of
chips x0 ≫ b0, where b0 is the initial blind. The ratio
x0/b0 is typically in the range 50 − 100 in actual poker
tournaments.
• The players take turns at dealing. In the model,
only the player next to the dealer, dubbed the “blinder”,
posts the blind bet. The blind increases exponentially
with time as, b(t) = b0 exp(t/t0).
• The tables run in parallel. At each table, the players
receive one card, c, which is a random number uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1.
• We define a critical hand value c0 ∈ [0, 1]. The fol-
lowing players bet the value b with probability e(c), if
0 ≤ c ≤ c0. e(c) is an evaluation function, whose de-
tails will be immaterial. Intuitively, e(c) should be an
increasing function of c, implying that a player will more
often play good hands than bad ones. We tried several
forms of e(c), obtaining the same results. In our simu-
lations, we choose e(c) = cn, where n is the number of
players having already bet, including the blinder. In this
case, e(c) is simply the probability that c is the best card
among n+ 1 random cards. This reflects the fact that a
player should be careful when playing bad hands if many
players have already bet. Determining the optimal eval-
uation function for a given θ, in the spirit of Borel’s and
von Neumann’s analysis for θ = 2, is a formidable task
which is left for a future study [16].
• The first player with a card c > c0 goes all-in, so
that q = 1 − c0 is the probability to go all-in. The next
players including the blinder can follow if their card is
greater than c0, and fold otherwise. If a player with a
card c > c0 cannot match the amount of chips of the first
player all-in, he simply bets all his chips, but can only
expect to win this amount from each of the other players
going all-in.
• Finally, the betting player with the highest card wins
the pot and the blinder gets the blind back if nobody else
bets. The players left with no chips are eliminated, and
after each deal, certain players may be redistributed to
other tables, in a process ensuring that the number of
tables remains minimum at all times and that no table
has less than [N/θ] players, where [·] denotes the integer
part function. After a deal is completed at all tables,
time is updated to t + 1, and the next deal starts. This
process is repeated until only one player is left.
III. POKER MODEL WITHOUT ALL-IN
PROCESSES
Let us first consider the unrealistic case q = 0. The
amount of chips or stack x(t) of a given player evolves
according to x(t+1) = x(t)+ε(t)b(t). The effective noise
ε(t) should have zero average since all players are consid-
ered equal and there is therefore no individual winning
strategy in the mathematical sense. ε(t) is also Marko-
vian, since successive deals are uncorrelated. We define
x¯(t) as the statistical average of x(t). If the typical value
of x ∼ x¯(t) remains significantly bigger than the blind
b(t), we can adopt a continuous time approach. Hence,
the evolution of x(t) is that of a generalized Brownian
walker:
dx
dt
= σb(t)η(t), (1)
where σ2 = ε¯2 is a constant of order unity, and η(t) is a δ-
correlated white noise. The number of surviving players
3with x chips, P (x, t), evolves according to the Fokker-
Planck equation
∂P
∂t
=
σ2b2(t)
2
∂2P
∂x2
, (2)
with the absorbing boundary condition P (x = 0, t) =
0, and initial condition P (x, t = 0) = δ(x − x0). This
kind of problem arises naturally in physics in the context
of persistence, which is the probability that a random
process x(t) never falls below a certain level [11, 12, 13].
Defining
τ(t) =
σ2b20t0
2
(
e
2t
t0 − 1
)
, (3)
Eq. (2) can be solved by the method of images [12]:
P (x, t) =
N0√
2piτ(t)
(
e−
(x−x0)
2
2τ(t) − e−
(x+x0)
2
2τ(t)
)
. (4)
Note that the above result holds for any form of b(t),
provided that one properly defines τ(t) = σ2
∫ t
0
b2(t′) dt′.
For large time (or τ ≫ 1), the distribution of chips
becomes scale invariant
P (x, t) =
N(t)
x¯(t)
f
(
x
x¯(t)
)
, (5)
where the density of surviving players is given by
N(t)
N0
=
2x0√
pit0σb0
e−
t
t0 . (6)
We find that the decay rate of the number of players is
exactly given by the growth rate of the blind, which thus
controls the pace of the tournament. The total duration
of a tournament tf is typically
tf
t0
= ln(N0)−
1
2
ln(t0) + ln
(
x0
b0
)
, (7)
which only grows logarithmically with the number of
players and the ratio x0/b0. The average stack is pro-
portional to the blind
x¯(t) =
N0
N(t)
x0 =
√
pit0σ
2
b(t). (8)
When t0 ≫ 1, this expression implies that x¯(t)/b(t)≫ 1,
hence validating the use of a continuous time approach.
Finally, we find that the normalized distribution of chips
is given by the Wigner distribution
f(X) =
pi
2
Xe−
pi
4X
2
, F (X) = 1− e−pi4X2 , (9)
where F (X) =
∫X
0
f(Y ) dY . Equivalently, in the context
of persistence, f is naturally found to be the first excited
eigenstate of the quantum harmonic oscillator [12]. The
scaling function f is universal, i.e. independent of all the
microscopic parameters (b0, t0, x0...). In Fig. 1, we plot
the normalized distribution f(X) = x¯(t)P (x, t)/N(t) and
its cumulative sum F (X) as a function of X = x/x¯(t),
as obtained from extensive numerical simulations of the
present poker model with q = 0. We find a perfect data
collapse on the analytical result of Eq. (9).
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FIG. 1: We plot the normalized distribution of chips f(X)
and its cumulative sum F (X) obtained from numerical simu-
lations of our poker model with q = 0 (thin lines; N0 = 10000,
t0 = 2000, x0/b0 = 100, 10000 “tournaments” played). These
distributions are extracted at times for which N(t)/N0 =
50%, 30%, 10%. The dashed lines correspond to the exact
solution, Eq. (9).
IV. POKER MODEL INCLUDING ALL-IN
PROCESSES
Let us now consider the more realistic case q > 0 (or
c0 < 1). A priori, it seems that q is a new parameter
whose precise value could dramatically affect the dynam-
ics of the game. In reality, q must be intimately related
to the decay rate t−10 of the number of players, which
is imposed by the exponential growth of the blind. To
see this, let us first compute the decay rate due to the
all-in processes. At a given table, and for small q, the
probability that an all-in process occurs is given by
Pall−in =
q2θ(θ − 1)
2
, (10)
where the factor q2 is the probability that two players go
all-in, and θ(θ − 1)/2 is the number of such pairs. Ex-
pecting q ≪ 1, we have neglected all-in processes involv-
ing more than two players. During a two-player all-in
process, there is a probability 1/2 that the losing player
is the one with the smallest number of chips (he is then
eliminated). Cumulating the results of the N/θ tables,
we find the density decay rate due to all-in processes
dN
dt all−in
= −1
2
×N
θ
×Pall−in = −
N
tall−in
, (11)
tall−in =
4
q2(θ − 1) . (12)
We now make the claim that the physically optimal
choice for tall−in, and hence for q, is such that the decay
rate due to all-in processes is equal to the one caused
by the stack fluctuations of order b(t). Since the to-
tal decay rate will be shown to remain equal to t−10 ,
tall−in = 2t0 should hold, since inverse decay rates add
4up. If tall−in < 2t0, the game is dominated by all-in pro-
cesses and x(t) can get rapidly large compared to b(t).
The first player to go all-in is acting foolishly and takes
the risk of being eliminated just to win the negligible
blind. Inversely, if tall−in > 2t0, players (especially those
with a declining stack) would be foolish not to make the
most of the opportunity to double their chips by going
all-in. We expect that real poker players would, on aver-
age, self-adjust their q to its optimal value. Finally, we
find that q is not a free parameter, but should take the
physical value
q =
√
2
(θ − 1)t0
. (13)
We now write the exact evolution equation for the
number of surviving players with x chips, combining the
effect of pots of order b and all-in processes
∂P
∂t
=
σ2b2
2
∂2P
∂x2
+
2
t0
(K(P )− P ), (14)
where the non linear all-in kernel K is given by
K(P ) =
1
4
P (x/2)
∫ +∞
x/2
P (y)
N
dy
+
1
2
∫ x/2
0
P (x− y)P (y)
N
dy
+
1
2
∫ +∞
0
P (x+ y)
P (y)
N
dy, (15)
and where we have dropped the time variable argument
for clarity. In Eq. (14), the factor 2/t0 = q
2(θ − 1) is
simply the rate of all-in processes involving the consid-
ered player, without presuming the outcome of the event.
In addition, the first term of Eq. (15) describes processes
where the considered player has doubled his chips by win-
ning against a player with more chips than him. The
second term corresponds to an all-in process where the
player has won against a player with less chips than him
(and has eliminated this player). Finally, the last term
describes the loss against a player with less chips than
him (otherwise the considered player is eliminated). In-
tegrating Eq. (15) over x, we check that the probability to
survive an all-in process is 3
4
, the two first terms adding
up to 1
2
. Indeed, the player survives if he wins (with prob-
ability 1
2
) or if he loses, but only against a player with
less chips (with probability 1
4
). We recover the decay rate
associated to all-in processes,
(
1− 3
4
)
× 2t0 = t
−1
all−in
.
We now look for a scaling solution of Eq. (15) of the
form
P (x, t) =
λ
xˆ(t)2
f
(
x
xˆ(t)
)
, (16)
where the integral of f is normalized to 1, so that N(t) =
λ/xˆ(t). Plugging this ansatz into Eq. (14), we find that
0 1 2 3 40
1
F(X)
f(X)
X
FIG. 2: We plot the normalized distribution of chips f(X)
and its cumulative sum F (X) obtained from numerical sim-
ulations of our poker model (thin dotted lines, N0 = 10000,
t0 = 2000, x0/b0 = 100, 10000 “tournaments” played). These
distributions are extracted at times for which N(t)/N0 =
50%, 30%, 10%. The dashed lines correspond to the numerical
solution of the exact Eq. (18). The data recorded from 20 real
poker tournaments (totalizing 1584 players still in) are also
plotted (full lines), and are found to agree remarkably with
the present theory. Note that f(X) for real tournaments was
obtained by differentiating a fitting function to the actual cu-
mulative sum. We also plot the standard but noisier bin plot
of the distribution of chips in real poker tournaments (circles).
one must have xˆ(t) ∼ b(t) for all the terms to scale in the
same manner. Defining
xˆ(t) =
√
t0σb(t)
2
∼ x¯(t) ∼ e tt0 , (17)
and the scaling variable X = x/xˆ(t), we obtain the fol-
lowing integrodifferential equation for f(X)
f ′′(X) +Xf ′(X) + 1
2
f(X/2)
∫+∞
X/2
f(Y ) dY
+
∫X/2
0
f(X − Y )f(Y ) dY
+ 1
2
∫ +∞
0
f(X + Y )f(Y ) dY = 0, (18)
with the boundary condition f(0) = 0. We did not suc-
ceed in solving this equation analytically. However, the
small and large X behavior of f(X) can be extracted
from Eq. (18):
f(X) ∼
X→0
X
2
, f(X) ∼
X→+∞
2µe−µX . (19)
Thus, when including all-in processes, the universal scal-
ing distribution decays more slowly than for q = 0.
Eq. (18) can be easily solved numerically using a stan-
dard iteration scheme, and we find µ ≈ 1.562.
In Fig. 2, we plot the normalized distribution f(X) as
a function of X = x/x¯(t) obtained from extensive numer-
ical simulations of the present poker model, with q given
by Eq. (13). We find a perfect data collapse on the nu-
merical solution of the exact scaling equation Eq. (18).
50 1 2 3 4 5
X
0
1
F(
X)
0 1 2 3 4 5X
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
1-
F(
X)
0 1 2 3X
0
1
F(
X)
FIG. 3: We plot the integrated density distribution F (X)
extracted from Internet tournaments (same as Fig. 2; black
line), and from the four main events of the WPT 2006 sea-
son (ranking after day 1 and day 2 totalizing 1256 players;
turquoise line), and compare them to the numerical solution
of the exact Eq. (18) (dashed line), and to the analytical re-
sult Eq. (9) of the poker model for q = 0 (dotted line). The
bottom insert illustrates the exponential decay of 1 − F (x),
instead of the Gaussian decay predicted by the simple model
with q = 0. In the top insert, we plot F (X) for each individual
WPT tournaments (day 1 only; for the sake of clarity).
In order to check the relevance of this parameter-free
distribution to real poker tournaments, we visited two
popular on-line poker playing zones, and followed 20 no-
limit Texas hold’em tournaments with an initial number
of players in the range 250 − 800. When the number of
players was down to the range N ∼ 60 − 130, we manu-
ally recorded their number of chips [17]. Fig. 2 shows the
remarkable agreement between these data and the results
of the present model. The maximum of the distribution
corresponds to players holding around 55% of the average
number of chips per player. In addition, a player owning
twice the average stack per player (X = 2) precedes 90%
of the other players, whereas a player with half the aver-
age stack (X = 1/2) precedes only 25% of the other play-
ers. In Fig. 3, we compare these results to data collected
from the four main events of the World Poker Tour 2006
season [18]. Although the level of play is incomparably
better than on typical Internet poker rooms (the buy-in
of 10000 $ or more is also incomparable), the stacks dis-
tributions are very similar and decay exponentially (see
the prediction of Eq. (19)), as illustrated in the bottom
insert of Fig. 3. The model without all-in events (q = 0)
would predict a faster Gaussian decay. The fact that we
find similar results for two very different kinds of poker
tournaments certainly justifies the universal nature of the
present theory.
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FIG. 4: We plot the average number of chip leaders LN0
as a function of the number of initial players N0, finding a
convincing logarithmic growth (full symbols correspond to the
case q = 0). The insert shows the logarithmic growth of rmax
(defined in the text). The dashed lines correspond to log-
linear fits of the data.
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FIG. 5: We plot the normalized cumulative distribution G(z)
of the fortune of the chip leader recorded when N(t)/N0 =
40%, 20%, 10% (thin dotted lines, all-in processes included,
N0 = 10000, t0 = 2000, x0/b0 = 100, 10000 “tournaments”
played). We also plot the derivative g(z) of a multi-variable
fit of these data (full line) as well as the standard scatter
bin plot (circles). The data convincingly follow the universal
Gumbel distribution (dashed lines).
V. PROPERTIES OF THE CHIP LEADER
We now consider the statistical properties of the player
with the largest amount of chips at a given time, dubbed
the chip leader. First, we consider the average number
of chip leaders LN0 in a tournament with N0 initial play-
ers. In many competitive situations [3, 4, 5], arising for
instance in biological evolution models [3, 4], it is found
that LN0 grows logarithmically with the number of com-
peting agents N0, a general result which has been estab-
lished analytically in [4]. We confirm that in the present
model, with or without all-in processes, the same phe-
nomenon is observed (see Fig. 4). We have also computed
6the average maximum ratio rmax = supt x¯lead/x¯. In the
present model, xlead/x¯ increases rapidly on a scale of or-
der t0, and then decays (almost linearly with time) to
∼ 1.5, where it becomes non self-averaging due to large
fluctuations at the end of the tournament. Fig. 4 illus-
trates the logarithmic growth of rmax as a function of
N0. For N0 = 500, which is typical of Internet tourna-
ments, we find rmax ≈ 4.6, which is fully compatible with
a superficial analysis of real data.
Extreme value statistics have recently attracted a lot
of attention from physicists in various contexts [14].
In this regard, we have checked that z = (xlead −
x¯lead)/(x¯2lead − x¯2lead)1/2 is distributed according to the
universal Gumbel distribution
g(z) =
pi√
6
exp[−Z − exp(−Z)], (20)
where Z = piz/
√
6 + γ, and γ is Euler’s constant. Such
a behavior, which is typical of independent, or at least
weakly correlated random variables [15], is illustrated on
Fig. 5.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed a quantitative theory
of poker tournaments and made the connection between
this problem and persistence in physics, the leader prob-
lem in evolutionary biology, and extreme value statistics.
In particular, we have identified the two main ingredients
controlling the dynamics of a tournament: the exponen-
tial increase of the blind, and the necessity to include
all-in events where at least two players bet their entire
stack. In order to mimic the play of “intelligent” play-
ers, we found that the probability of going all-in should
take a well-defined value. This theory leads to a quan-
titative understanding of the scale-invariant stack dis-
tribution observed in Internet and WPT tournaments,
and predicts rich statistical features concerning the chip
leader.
In a future work [16], we plan to implement in our
model the optimal strategies for folding, betting or go-
ing all-in, hence eliminating the only free parameter q.
Preliminary results [16] indicate that the optimal prob-
ability q0 to be the first to go all-in is a simple function
of the current pot P , of the chip stack x of the con-
sidered player, and of xk, the stack of the k-th player
left to bet (among a total of n such players). Defin-
ing Xk = min(xk, x), and qk as the probability that the
player k calls the all-in bet of the first player (and ne-
glecting multiple calls), we find [16]
qk = q0
Xk + P
Xk + 2P
, (21)
P =
n∑
k=1
qkXk
n∏
j=k
(1− qj)−1 , (22)
where q0 is the solution of the implicit Eq. (22), after
inserting the expression of qk obtained in Eq. (21). A de-
tailed analysis of Eqs. (21,22) reveals that the obtained
optimal strategy perfectly reproduces qualitative features
observed in real tournaments, notably the fact that play-
ers with a small stack go more often all-in than others
(and are often called). In addition, direct confrontations
between two players owning a big stack (in units of x¯) are
rare, except if the pot is already huge, and only happens
when both players have a very good hand.
Finally, it would be interesting to obtain access to
the full dynamical evolution of a large sample of real-
life poker tournaments, in order to check the predictions
of the model concerning the chip leader and to identify
other remarkable statistical properties of poker tourna-
ments.
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